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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Christopher Allen Stone appeals from the judgment entered upon his 
conditional guilty plea to second-degree murder. Stone challenges the district 
court's denial of his suppression motion. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
On August 29, 2010, at approximately 6:00 p.m., Corporal Paul Maund, 
and several other officers, were dispatched to a residence in Caldwell, Idaho to 
investigate a shooting. (Tr., p.210, L.6 - p.211, L.15; R., p.10.) Upon arrival, 
Corporal Maund saw two cars parked in the driveway of the residence and a 
man, later identified as Stone, talking on his cell phone. (Tr., p.212, Ls.3-23.) 
Corporal Maund ordered Stone to approach him at which time Stone told the 
person he was talking to something along the lines of, "Okay, the police are here 
now, I guess I'll hang up." (Tr., p.213, Ls.3-10.) As the officers made contact 
with Stone, "he said it was self-defense, she had stabbed him and that he had to 
do it." (Tr., p.214, Ls.17-19.) The person Stone Was referring to was his 
estranged wife, Florence. (R., p.10.) Florence "was located a short distance 
away slumped in the back of a mini-van parked in the driveway. She was laying 
face down in a pool of blood with what appeared to be two gunshot wounds to 
the back of her head." (R., p.10.) 
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Deputy Frank Hernandez read Stone his Miranda 1 rights while they waited 
for medics to arrive. (Tr., p.225, L.13 - p.226, L.11; Exhibit 1, p.2, L.25 - p.3, 
L.7.) Stone said he understood his rights and "just began talking" to Deputy 
Hernandez although Deputy Hernandez was not asking Stone any questions. 
(Tr., p.226, Ls.11-22; Exhibit 1, p.3, Ls.8-9.) Stone volunteered his age, the fact 
that he was a speech pathologist, and said "he'd never been arrested, never 
been stabbed, nor had he ever shot anyone." (Tr., p.226, Ls.13-18.) Deputy 
Hernandez testified Stone was calm, "[c]onsidering the circumstances." (Tr., 
p.226, L.23 - p.227, L.1.) 
Once the ambulance arrived, Deputy Hernandez accompanied Stone to 
Saint Alphonsus Regional Medical Center for treatment of Stone's stab wound. 
(Tr., p.227, Ls.2-11; R., p.10.) Deputy Hernandez was the only police officer in 
the ambulance with Stone and only questioned Stone in response to statements 
Stone made. (Tr., p.227, L.13 - p.228, L.17.) Deputy Hernandez remained with 
Stone the entire time he was at the hospital. (Tr., p.228, Ls.7-9.) During this 
time, Stone made numerous statements regarding his version of events.2 (See 
generally Exhibit 1.) Stone said Florence came over to pick up some of her 
belongings, which he put on the porch because he would not let her into the 
house. (Exhibit 1, p.19, Ls.20-25.) Stone then explained: 
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
2 The transcript of this interaction only specifically identifies Stone as a speaker; 
all others are described as "unidentified speaker." (See generally Exhibit 1.) 
Thus, it is unclear who is asking questions and who Stone is making statements 
to at any given time. However, from the context, although Deputy Hernandez 
was present, it appears Stone is often talking to medical personnel. 
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I said, "Here's your stuff," and she carried the sewing machine to 
the van and I -- and then she picked up some box and she set the 
box down and the next thing I know, her head's turned and there's 
a fricking knife going inside of me. I mean it - she probably had 
only been there 60 seconds and we fought for, shit, I don't know, at 
least - it seemed like an eternity but we fought for a bit over the 
fricking knife. I had my hand on her knife. We were going back 
and forth and . . .. The knife didn't just go in and out. The knife 
was going (inaudible). She was trying to push it in and I was trying 
to push it out and all we were doing was we were doing this. And 
then I thought about my gun. I pulled my gun right out of my -- I 
have a little J-Frame Smith and Wesson that I carry and I just went 
bam, bam right in the back of her head and then I took my knife out. 
And then I thought holy shit. What do I do? 
(Exhibit 1, p.20, LsA-22.) 
On the way to and while at the hospital, Stone continued to talk to Deputy 
Hernandez. Stone's statements included: (1) "I have nothing to hide." (Exhibit 
1, p.1S, L.1S); (2) "I'm not making no bones. I shot my wife. I ain't making no 
bones about it." (Exhibit 1, p.1S, Ls.17-1S); (3) "I just killed my wife." (Exhibit 1, 
p.6); (4) "Fuck. What a stupid bitch." (Exhibit 1, p.17, L.1S); (S) "What a stupid 
bitch to pull a knife." (Exhibit 1, p.1S, L.24); (6) "I'm cognitive, I'm coherent, I'm in 
a little bit of pain. I feel awful about what just happened but to tell you the truth, 
the way she was looking at me, one of us was going to die or get really fucked up 
and I didn't choose this." (Exhibit 1, p.23, LsA-S); (7) "Oh, shit, man. You know 
what? (Inaudible) their mommy's gone. It doesn't bother me that she's gone for 
what she did to me." (Exhibit 1, p.2S, Ls.20-22); (S) "As far as I'm concerned, it 
was my life or hers and I ain't the one that started this shit. I'm glad my kids were 
not at home. We got into a big thing about that because tonight my kids are all, 'I 
don't want to go to grandma and grandpa's today. We want to stay at home ... ' 
I'm all, 'You know the way your mom and I are. We're probably going to be out 
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there fighting and she's going to be unhappy about what she gets. She's going 
to be unhappy about this and I don't want --' and I talk like that to them." (Exhibit 
1, p.29, Ls.7-17); (9) "Bam, bam. And I shot twice. I hope that was the right 
thing. I fired once and I -- and I just always thought if I ever got in a gun fight, I'd 
shoot at least twice. . .. I've read enough books and things, you know, that's a 
good thing to do." (Exhibit 1, p.34, L.24 - p.35, L.6); (10) "(Inaudible) think maybe 
I should be scared to death and going to jail for the rest of my life but I'm really 
not because, you know, I mean it's not like they -- it's not like I walked up there 
and shot her or it's not like I walked into a liquor store and shot someone to steal 
money .... It was going to be me or her." (Exhibit 1, pA8, Ls.8-15); (11) "[S]he 
likes to fuck guys." (Exhibit 1, p.51, L.19); (12) "And I've had it with the affairs." 
(Exhibit 1, p.52, L.12); (13) "I mean if she would have been faithful to me ... 
we'd still be married and she'd still be alive .... And our kids would be happy." 
(Exhibit 1, p.52, L.23 - p.53, LA); (14) "[She has been in the United States] 
[s]ince she was 18 when we got married .... She married me for a green card. I 
don't know about that because we had - we had many happy years together." 
(Exhibit 1, p.55, L.24 - p.56, L.5); (15) "I have a concealed weapons permit. I 
know that doesn't give me the right to go around and shoot people .... I've read 
up on the law a lot but I do know one thing, if I -- even having that, that permit 
didn't save my life .... What saved my life is deciding to put that gun in my 
pocket tonight and I'm usually in the habit of doing that." (Exhibit 1, p.57, L.25 -
p.58, L.10); (16) "She's a nice girl. She's just -- if she was a faithful girl, we'd still 
be married. She'd be alive and I wouldn't be sitting here." (Exhibit 1, p.60, Ls.13-
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15); (17) "I'm not scared .... Maybe I should be. Maybe I'm stupid .... 
(Inaudible) one of us was going to -- we were both going to get messed up or one 
of us was going to die." (Exhibit 1, p.61, Ls.2-S); and (1S) "What a stupid bitch. 
What a stupid bitch." (Exhibit 1, p.62, Ls.16-17). 
As Stone reiterated his opinion that Florence was a "stupid bitch," 
Detective Christopher McCormick entered the hospital room where Stone was 
and introduced himself. (Exhibit 2, p.3, Ls.11-13; Tr., p.254, Ls.4-12.) Stone and 
Detective McCormick then engaged in the following conversation: 
MR. STONE: ... If your name is Chris, I already like you. 
DET. McCORMICK: Well, you know, I appreciate that. It looks like 
you've been here hanging out with Frank [Hernandez], my buddy, 
here for a while. 
MR. STONE: Yeah. 
DET. McCORMICK: Are they taking good care of you? 
MR. STONE: Are you a cop too? 
DET. McCORMICK: I'm a cop too. (Inaudible) haircut, Frank? 
MR. STONE: He's taken real good care of me. I was just sitting 
here telling him maybe I'm a fool but I'm not even that -- you heard 
what happened. 
DET. McCORMICK: I've got a little bit of it. 
MR. STONE: I guess that's - you're here to ask some questions. 
DET. McCORMICK: Sure. 
MR. STONE: I'm not even going to -- maybe I should be scared to 
death about going to jail but to be honest with you, I ain't scared. 
DET. McCORMICK: You know what, Chris We just want to--
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MR. STONE: My wife was going to die, I was going to die or we 
were both going to get messed up with a knife. 
DET. McCORMICK: That's what we're here for. I want to know 
what happened. 
MR. STONE: And she made that choice. 
(Exhibit 2, p.3, L.14 - pA, L.15.) 
Detective McCormick then told Stone he "want[ed] to know what 
happened," but first wanted to make sure they made appropriate arrangements 
for Stone's children. (Exhibit 2, pA, Ls.16-18.) After addressing this issue, 
Detective McCormick again advised Stone of his Miranda rights and Stone 
reiterated that he understood those rights. (Exhibit 2, p.9, L.23 - p.1 0, L.11; Tr., 
p.256, Ls.17-24.) Detective McCormick testified that Stone's demeanor at that 
time was "[p]leasant, joking, alert, lucid" and he noted Stone was "talkative" and 
"appear[ed] to be outgoing." (Tr., p.258, Ls.8-19.) Detective McCormick further 
testified that Stone appeared to understand what he was being asked, was 
coherent, and did not seem to be under the influence. (Tr., p.259, LA - p.260, 
L.3.) 
When Detective McCormick ultimately asked Stone what happened, Stone 
said: "I told Frank [Hernandez] 100 times. 1'1/ tell you." (Exhibit 2, p.11, Ls.3-5.) 
Stone then proceeded to describe his past and present relationship with his wife, 
including her past infidelity and their contentious divorce proceedings, and he 
repeated that Florence stabbed him, so he shot her. (See generally Exhibit 2, 
pp.11-18.) Detective McCormick then asked Stone for additional detail regarding 
the knife, how Florence allegedly stabbed him, and how Stone shot her. (Exhibit 
6 
2, pp.1S-50.) Stone and Detective McCormick then discussed what Stone did 
after he shot Florence. (Exhibit 2, pp.51-54.) Stone also told Detective 
McCormick that his wife had a habit of pulling knives on him, "noting she's a 
Philippino [sic] girl and she was using a machete. I'm not going to say she's 
been fascinated by knives but whenever she'd get mad at me, she probably 
picked up a knife a dozen times since we've been married." (Exhibit 2, p.56, 
Ls.19-23.) Stone also insisted, "She came over there to do this to me tonight." 
(Exhibit 2, p.65, Ls.14-15; see also p.65, L.23 - p.66, L.2.) 
At one point during Detective McCormick's interview of Stone, Stone was 
transported to get a CAT scan. (See Exhibit 2, p.90, LsA-6; Tr., p.262, Ls.21-
23.) Shortly before that happened, Stone asked Detective McCormick, "Does 
that sound sick saying that [I don't feel bad about shooting her] or how does that 
-- that must sound really like I'm a heartless person but it's either her or me." 
(Exhibit 2, p.95, Ls.6-S.) Detective McCormick answered: 
You know, Chris, like I told you when I came in here, I don't 
judge, you know. What you think, what you feel, why it is you feel 
the way you do, there's a reason for it and that's something you 
need to come to terms with. 
I'm here to make sure - you know, find out what happened 
at the house because, like I said, the two people that were there, 
one of them I can't talk to right now. So you're about the best 
means aside from my CSl's that are there at the scene. 
The good thing is I've got some really good CSI's there so, 
you know, just like the movie -- the difference between us and the 
movies, the movies, everything's done in half an hour. It's going to 
be a long drawn out process but they are good. We're able to 
substantiate or disprove, you know, pretty much anything and 
everything you said. 
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So that's why -- you know, it's a testing thing. Not only are 
you my only witness on this but it's also it's a testing thing because 
I can tell if you're being honest with me, if you're being .truthful 
based on what you're telling me, based on what's on scene. The 
scene tells what happened. There's no two ways about it. 
So I need to get your side of it. I talked to the guys on 
scene. They tell me, yeah this is - this is the position she was in 
when she got shot. This, that and the other matches. It all makes 
sense. If there's something that doesn't match, that's when we go 
back and we revisit it and find out why it isn't matching. What 
happened what was the loss in translation. 
(Exhibit 2, p.95, L.9 - p.96, L.12.) Stone's response and the ensuing 
conversation was as follows: 
MR. STONE: I know one thing for sure, man, I never -- I never saw 
the front of her face. Look - I saw her from the back but I know 
when I - when I leaned over, there was a lot of blood. 
DET. McCORMICK: These guys are really eager to get you on 
there. I know I'm holding you up. One last question I had for you. 
You said all the other - the dozen times that she's wielded a knife, 
had a knife, you never felt threatened at that point. My 
understanding she's a pretty small petite little girl for the most part? 
MR. STONE: Yeah. 
DET. McCORMICK: You said that she was fighting you pretty good 
from this position. I'm thinking -- just myself and I'd like to think I'm 
in decent shape. I don't have a whole lot of strength at this 
position. I'm trying to figure out why she would put up such a fight 
or if she was trying to assault you, why she would have done it from 
there. If I had intentions of killing you, I'd probably do it head on or 
I'd get you behind the back or I'd do something. This kind of puts 
her in a vulnerable position if she wants -- you know what I'm 
saying? 
MR. STONE: That's really true. 
DET. McCORMICK: It's really kind of bothering me. 
MR. STONE: And she has no clue that I carry that gun because -- I 
mean she knows I carry that gun everywhere but I was at our 
house and there are a lot of times at the house that I don't carry the 
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gun. But typically when she's come by ... to pick up belongings 
just because of going through the divorce, I put that gun in my 
pocket. 
DET. McCORMICK: Think about what we talked about. These 
guys will get you taken care of. We'll talk about it again here in just 
a little bit. Okay? 
(Exhibit 2, p.96, L.13 - p.97, L.23.) Stone was then transported to get a CAT 
scan. (See Tr., p.262, L.23 - p.263, L.5.) 
When Stone returned from the CAT scan approximately 45 minutes later, 
"he change[d] his story slightly ... as far as his positioning when all this took 
place." (Tr., p.263, Ls.5-S.) Detective McCormick was also able to view the 
results of the scan, which showed Stone's injury "protruded at a downward 
angle." (Tr., p.264, L.23 - p.265, L.6.) Detective McCormick confronted Stone 
with this information and told Stone he believed Stone tried to stab himself. (Tr'J 
p.265, L.7 - p.266, L.5.) Stone denied Detective McCormick's allegation. (Tr., 
p.266, Ls.10-12.) Although Stone never admitted he stabbed himself, he later 
told Detective McCormick that he and Florence exchanged "some nasty words," 
which included Florence telling him "I just married you for a green card." (Exhibit 
2, p.292, LS.17 -19.) According to Stone, Florence said that "with her back to 
[him]" and he "pulled out [his] gun" and said, "I should just fucking kill you you 
lousy whore." (Exhibit 2, p.292, Ls.20-21.) Then, in Stone's words, Florence 
turned around and she had her little knife with her and we got into 
each other's face and we started saying shit to each other and she 
poked me with the knife and she started -- and I lifted my gun up 
and that's when I was going to shoot her and she turned her back 
to me and I killed her and that is the end of that. But if she -- we --
we were doing this kind of shit like this and I had the gun up and I'm 
telling her, ''I'm going to kill your ass," and I was doing that to her. 
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(Exhibit 2, p.292, L23 - p.293, L6.) 
A grand jury returned a superceding indictment charging Stone with 
second-degree murder and use of a firearm during the commission of a crime; 
however, the indictment was subsequently amended, by stipulation, to allege 
second-degree murder with the firearm enhancement. (R., pp.28-29, 79, 84-85.) 
Stone filed a motion to suppress, asserting his "interrogation ... was conducted 
in violation of his rights to remain silent, to due process of law, and to the 
assistance of counsel." (R., p.60.) At the hearing on his motion to suppress, 
Stone presented the testimony of two experts, Dr. Richard Of she and Dr. Craig 
Beaver. 3 Dr. Of she is a sociology professor who generally testified about police 
interrogation techniques and how he believed those techniques were employed 
during Detective McCormick's interview of Stone. (See generally Tr., pp.18-143 
and Exhibit A.) 
Dr. Beaver, a neuropsychologist who evaluated Stone and reviewed the 
medical records from Stone's treatment at Saint Alphonsus the night Stone 
murdered Florence as well as Detective McCormick's interview (Tr., pp.159-169), 
testified that, in his opinion, Stone is "highly suggestible in comparison to the 
average person" (Tr., p.169, Ls.14-15). Dr. Beaver noted Stone's score on the 
"Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scales" was "high in comparison to other criminal 
defendants" and indicated "substantial suggestibility." (Tr., p.171, Ls.14-18, 
p.176, Ls.7-15.) Dr. Beaver indicated Stone's score on the Gudjonsson test was 
3 The court allowed the testimony of Drs. Of she and Beaver as "offers of proof' 
and reserved ruling on whether the testimony would be considered in 
determining the merits of Stone's suppression motion. (Tr., p.151, Ls.7-11.) 
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the "strongest piece of data on that particular project [sic]." (Tr., p.177, Ls.10-
14.) Dr. Beaver further testified that although "Stone looks adequate in that he 
has average intelligence," "a master's degree related to speech pathology," and 
was "employed as a professional within the school district," Stone "describes a 
history of being socially anxious, ... , having difficulty with crowds, new social 
situations, not forming relationships within a social context," is "quite attached to 
his parents, but almost in a somewhat dependent way," and "describes having 
struggles with depression off and on" including being "psychiatrically hospitalized 
... a few years ago for a brief period of time when he was first diagnosed with 
diabetes." (Tr., p.170, L.7 - p.171, L.3.) According to Dr. Beaver, individuals, 
like Stone, who have "social anxiety are more prone to want to please people in 
authority or power" and "have difficulty thinking as clearly or recalling information 
as clearly." (Tr., p.177, L.25 - p.178, L.11.) Dr. Beaver also opined that Stone's 
general anxious disposition would be exacerbated by the "situation" he was in 
after he shot his wife and that "the context in which the interrogation by law 
enforcement took place would substantially increase the likelihood of his 
suggestibility" such that Stone was "not able to resist the stories and questions 
that the law enforcement person was offering to him." (Tr., p.178, Ls.12-20; 
p.181, L.4-p.182, L.11; p.188, Ls.2-5; p.189, L.25-p.190, L.7.) 
Dr. Beaver also provided testimony about Stone's blood sugar levels and 
the medication he was given while at Saint Alphonsus. Regarding Stone's blood 
sugar, Dr. Beaver noted Stone has Type II diabetes, which by Stone's own 
admission he "doesn't do a good job of controlling," and the "CBC workup that 
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was done at Saint Alphonsus indicated that his blood sugar level was over 400." 
(Tr., p.183, Ls.3-9.) Dr. Beaver stated this elevated blood sugar level "has an 
impact on a person's ability to think very clearly." (Tr., p.183, Ls.17-19.) With 
respect to the medication administered to Stone at the hospital, Dr. Beaver 
testified Stone was given Dilaudid, which he describes as a "very potent opiate 
type medication" that "has an almost hypnotic effect on individuals" such that it 
"not only clouds their perception and their thinking skills, but generally relaxes 
them, thus reducing their defenses." (Tr., p.183, L.20 - p.184, L.8.) 
After post-hearing briefing and oral argument, the court denied Stone's 
suppression motion. (Tr., pp.378-405; see also R., p.110.) In doing so, the court 
considered the entirety of Dr. Of she's testimony (Tr., p.383, L.20 - p.384, L.1) 
and Dr. Beaver's testimony about Stone's "diabetes and the effects of the pain 
medications administered to [him]," but "decline[d] to consider Dr. Beaver's 
testimony on the psychological makeup which may have caused [Stone] to 
change his recollection of events." (Tr., p.384, Ls.6-13). 
Pursuant to a binding Rule 11 plea agreement, in which Stone preserved 
his right to appeal the court's denial of his suppression motion, Stone pled guilty 
to second-degree murder and the state dismissed the sentencing enhancement 
and agreed to recommend a unified twenty-year sentence with ten years fixed, 
with Stone free to argue for a lesser sentence. (R., pp.135-139, 142-146.) The 
court imposed a unified twenty-year sentence with nine years fixed, and Stone 
filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.165-169.) 
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ISSUES 
Stone states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the court err in declining to consider the entire testimony 
of Craig Beaver in support of the motion to suppress? 
2. Did the court err in concluding that the statements were 
made voluntary in light ofthe evidence before it? 
(Opening Brief of Appellant ("Appellant's Brief'), p.12.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Stone failed to establish any error in relation to the district court's 
decision denying his motion to suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 
Stone Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of His Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
Stone asserts the district court erred in concluding his statements were 
voluntary and not the product of police coercion. (Appellant's Brief, pp.18-32.) A 
review of the record and the applicable legal standards shows Stone has failed to 
show error in the district court's contrary conclusion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a 
decision on a motion to suppress is challenged, the appellate court accepts the 
trial court's findings of fact that are supported by substantial evidence, but freely 
reviews the application of constitutional principles to those facts. State v. 
Klingler, 143 Idaho 494, 496, 148 P.3d 1240, 1242 (2006). Thus, where an 
appellant claims his statements were involuntary, this Court gives "deference to 
the lower court's findings of fact, if they are not clearly erroneous," but engages 
in "free review over the question of whether the facts found are constitutionally 
sufficient to show voluntariness." State v. Wilson, 126 Idaho 926, 928, 894 P.2d 
159, 161 (Ct. App. 1995). The "ultimate determination of voluntariness" is a legal 
question freely reviewed. Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287 (1991). If 
the state proves, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a defendant's 
statements were voluntarily made, suppression is not appropriate. Colorado v. 
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 (1986); State v. Valero, _ Idaho _, 285 P.3d 
1014,1016 (Ct. App. 2012) (citations omitted). 
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C. Stone's Statements Were Not The Product Of Coercion, Which Is A 
Necessary Predicate To A Finding That His Admissions Were Not 
Voluntary 
"[C]oercive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a 
confession is not 'voluntary' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment." Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986). 
Indeed, "coercive government misconduct was the catalyst for th[e] [Supreme] 
Court's seminal confession case, Brown v. Mississippi," 297 U.S. 278 (1936), 
and "the cases considered by th[e] Court" post-Brown "have focused upon the 
crucial element of police overreaching." Connelly, 479 U.S. at 163-164. "While 
each confession case has turned on its own set of factors justifying the 
conclusion that police conduct was oppressive, all have contained a substantial 
element of coercive police conduct." kL at 164. "Absent police conduct causally 
related to the confession, there is simply no basis for concluding that any state 
actor has deprived a criminal defendant of due process of law." kL 
Stone acknowledges, as he must, that "police overreaching is necessary 
to establish involuntariness." (Appellant's Brief, p.17 (emphasis original).) He 
argues, however, that such overreaching occurred in this case, claiming he was 
(1) "taken into custody at gunpoint sometime shortly after 6:00 p.m. and 
remained in the custody of police officers for the ensuing eight hours;" (2) 
"extensively questioned, resulting in a transcript of some 396 pages;" (3) 
"subjected to incommunicado detention;" (4) "denied access to his parents 
despite repeated requests (both by him and his parents) for a meeting;" (5) 
"denied access to his cell phone, by which he could have contacted [his parents] 
15 
or other supportive persons directly;" (6) "denied access to a bathroom;" and (7) 
"subjected to psychologically coercive interrogation techniques." (Appellant's 
Brief, p.15.) Stone's assertions are, in some instances, factually erroneous and 
otherwise fail to show coercive police conduct. Each assertion will be addressed 
in turn. 
While the police undoubtedly had their weapons drawn when they first 
approached Stone, to claim this was improper, much less legally significant in 
relation to statements made several hours later, is disingenuous. Not only is it 
unsurprising that law enforcement would approach Stone in the manner they did 
given the circumstances with which they were confronted, it was constitutionally 
reasonable and ultimately has no logical relationship to any claim by Stone that 
his subsequent admissions were involuntary. There is no evidence that Stone 
was held at gunpoint once he was placed in handcuffs, which were removed to 
facilitate medical care (Tr., p.393, Ls.14-17), nor is there evidence that any 
member of law enforcement drew a weapon at anytime during the ensuing eight 
hours. To claim, as Stone does, that the officers' act of drawing a weapon when 
responding to a scene where someone has been shot constitutes any sort of 
overreaching or coercion is completely without merit. 
The fact that Stone was in the presence of law enforcement for eight 
hours also fails to demonstrate police overreaching. It is not as if the police 
detained Stone at the station or any other building affiliated with law 
enforcement. Indeed, the district court found that Stone was not even in custody. 
(Tr., p.393, L.21 - p.395, L.5.) The eight hours Stone refers to covers the period 
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extending from the initial contact to Stone's arrest. During that entire time, Stone 
was either at his house, in the ambulance, or at the hospital being treated. The 
police certainly were not overreaching by insisting that a member of law 
enforcement remain in Stone's presence during that period given that he readily 
and immediately admitted he shot his estranged wife. Even if Stone's medical 
care concluded prior to the expiration of that eight-hour period, it was not 
coercive for the police to continue to interview him. If anything, continuing the 
interview in the hospital setting weighs against any claim of coercion as it is not 
the sort of "police-dominated atmosphere" that led the Supreme Court to require 
Miranda warnings. Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292, 296 (1990) ("The warning 
mandated by Miranda was meant to preserve the privilege during 
incommunicado interrogation of individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere. 
That atmosphere is said to generate inherently compelling pressures which work 
to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he 
would not otherwise freely do so.") (citations and quotations omitted). 
Although Stone was undoubtedly questioned, this fact alone does not 
constitute coercion and it is hardly significant that the transcript of the interviews 
was "some 369 pages." (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) The transcripts of the relevant 
interviews reveal not only multiple conversations completely unrelated to the 
murder, including conversations with medical personnel, they also reflect Stone 
was extremely talkative. The length of the transcripts is in no way meaningful to 
the question of coercion. 
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Stone's claim that he was subjected to "incommunicado detention" is also 
belied by the record. (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) As noted, Stone was not secluded 
by law enforcement and denied contact with anyone other than police. He was at 
a hospital, frequently in the company of medical staff, and was in no way isolated 
from the outside world, which is a significant circumstance when considering any 
claim of coercion. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 433, 438-439 (1984) 
(rejecting argument that Miranda should be extended to traffic stops, noting "[t]he 
purposes of the safeguards prescribed by Miranda are to ensure that the police 
do not coerce or trick captive suspects into confessing, to relieve the inherently 
compelling pressures generated by the custodial setting itself," and reasoning 
those purposes are not advanced in traffic stops given the exposure of such 
stops to "public view," which "both reduces the ability of an unscrupulous 
policeman to use illegitimate means to elicit self-incriminating statements and 
diminishes the motorist's fear that, if he does not cooperate, he will be subjected 
to abuse") (citations omitted). That he was not allowed to make any calls was 
also not coercive for at least two reasons. First, when police first responded to 
Stone's house, Stone was on the telephone - an opportunity that he apparently 
took advantage of to do the very thing he claims police prevented - to "contact .. 
. supportive persons directly." (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) Second, there is no 
constitutional mandate requiring officers to allow an individual to use a phone 
whenever he feels like it. While holding someone "incommunicado" is a relevant 
factor to consider for purposes of analyzing police conduct, because Stone did 
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not actually find himself in this position, he cannot establish any coercion based 
on this factor. 
Another claim contradicted by the record is that the police denied Stone 
access to the bathroom. (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) As reflected in the portion of 
the transcript Stone cites in support of this assertion, this is simply not true. The 
transcript (including the portion Stone cites and some additional conversation) 
reads: 
MR. STONE: If you could check, I'm going to have a big diarrhea 
mess all over this bed. I don't know what these guys are doing. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: No, no. I know what you're saying, 
yeah. 
MR. STONE: These doctors, I don't know if I got to poop myself 
and wait for them to clean me up or what but --
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Gosh. 
MR. STONE: I've been telling them for a half an hour to - I just had 
a major enema and it's all I can to keep it in me. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: (Inaudible.) 
MR. STONE: They were going to let me out. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Thank you. She's coming right now. 
MR. STONE: And I don't know how much is going to come out but 
I felt it starting to. 
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Sure. You know, I mean considering 
the last couple of hours, you know. 
(Exhibit 2, p.161, Ls.3-21.) 
The state is confident, from the context of this exchange, that law 
enforcement did not administer the enema or instruct Stone that he could not use 
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the bathroom to relieve himself much less condition Stone's use of the bathroom 
on his willingness to confess. While hospital staff may have restricted Stone's 
ability to use the bathroom for medical reasons, their actions do not translate into 
a finding of police overreaching. If anything, assuming the "unidentified speaker" 
in the above excerpt was an officer, law enforcement was sympathetic to Stone's 
needs but had no "authority" to interfere with Stone's medical care and give him 
permission to use the bathroom. 
Stone's final attempt to establish the coercion requirement rests on his 
claim that "he was subjected to psychologically coercive interrogation 
techniques." (Appellant's Brief, p.15.) More specifically, Stone contends the 
"officers deceptively posited themselves as friends ... or as neutral fact finders," 
"repeatedly use[d] the technique of minimization," and promised "leniency" in 
return for Stone's admissions. (Appellant's Brief, pp.25-32 (emphasis omitted).) 
Stone is incorrect. 
Even a cursory analysis of the statements Stone relies on in an effort to 
demonstrate coercion by kindness, fails to support his claim that any member of 
law enforcement was trying to "trick" him into believing they were just friends. 
For example, Stone asserts, "The police stated that 'our main concern now is 
your well being internally, you know?'" (Appellant's Brief, p.25 (quoting Exhibit 1, 
p.28, LS.20-21 ).) The full exchange reflected in the transcript is as follows: 
MR. STONE: I hope I don't get in trouble over this. I know I killed 
someone. I hope I don't get in trouble over this. 
UNIDENTIFED SPEAKER: I'm not a police officer. 
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UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: Again, like he mentioned earlier, our 
main concern now is your well being internally, you know? 
(Exhibit 1, p.28, Ls.15-21.) 
Again assuming the relevant unidentified speaker was actually a police 
officer, it is unclear how a statement that, on its face, reflects concern for Stone's 
injury can be interpreted as a coercive tactic designed to elicit an incriminating 
response from Stone. It is equally unclear how conveying to Stone that law 
enforcement had an obligation to conduct a "very thorough investigation" to 
protect Stone as much as Florence reflects an attempt to lull Stone into a false 
sense of security or mislead him about the officers' intentions. (Appellant's Brief, 
p.25 (quoting Exhibit 2, p.142, Ls.2-24).) This is especially true considering that 
statement was made in response to Stone asking: "Will you guys be contacting 
me? I don't even -- my kids are going to wonder why they're not going to school 
tomorrow." (Exhibit 2, p.142, Ls.18-20.) 
Detective McCormick's characterization of himself as a "fact finder" also 
falls far short of demonstrating "psychological coercion" given that is precisely 
what he was doing; that the "facts" are not favorable to Stone does not mean the 
detective was overreaching. Frankly, the state's view of the interaction between 
Stone and law enforcement is that it was Stone who went to great lengths to 
befriend the officers, perhaps believing it would improve his chances of being 
found credible. That said, even if the officers' comments can be fairly interpreted 
as attempts to befriend Stone, displays of friendship or sympathy are not 
improper and do not qualify as coercion. See,~, Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 
104 (1985); Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969); State v. Wilson, 126 Idaho 
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926, 894 P.2d 159 (Ct. App. 1995) (concluding that because the defendant 
understood his Miranda rights, downplaying the seriousness of the charges, 
stressing the harm that might come to Wilson's family, and implying that leniency 
would follow a confession, did not make confession involuntary); Beltz v. State, 
980 P.2d 474, 478 (Alaska Ct. App. 1999) (noting general rule that being 
sympathetic or friendly or professing a desire to help the defendant "does not 
itself render a subsequent confession involuntary"); Sheriff, Washoe County v. 
Bessey, 914 P.2d 618, 621-622 (Nevada 1996) (noting police techniques such as 
"offering false sympathy, blaming the victim, minimizing the seriousness of the 
charge, using a good-cap/bad-cop routine, or suggesting there is sufficient 
evidence when there is not" are permissible police interviewing techniques). 
Stone's minimization claim is closely intertwined with his claim that 
Detective McCormick improperly promised leniency if Stone would admit that 
Florence did not actually stab him. Stone argues that Detective McCormick 
minimized what Stone had done by noting it was not the "crime of the century" 
and asserts "[m]inimization is a well-recognized technique for impliedly promising 
leniency." (Appellant's Brief, p.28.) Although Stone restates the argument in 
several ways, the leniency Stone ultimately claims Detective McCormick 
promised was that if Stone agreed to Detective McCormick's "view of what 
transpired," the judge would be more lenient. (Appellant's Brief, p.30.) In order 
to make this argument, Stone essentially reconstructs the sequence of 
questioning to bolster his proposition. For example, Stone notes Detective 
McCormick told him he was "trying to give [Stone] an out" and "then ... warn[ed] 
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[Stone] that failing to take his 'way out''' would have "tragic consequences," as 
illustrated by Detective McCormick telling Stone earlier, "I need to know because 
if I don't know then I've got to put these pieces together and fill the blanks with 
what I think happened." (Appellant's Brief, p.29 (citations omitted).) Stone then 
goes on to string together statements from various parts of the interview without 
regard to context. (Appellant's Brief, p.29.) 
Acknowledging that the Court will consider the totality of the 
circumstances in determining whether Detective McCormick's actions were 
coercive, it is still important to evaluate the entirety of the interaction between 
Detective McCormick and Stone as it occurred and with due consideration for the 
statements Stone was making. Viewed appropriately in that light, Stone's claim 
that Detective McCormick was improperly implying or promising leniency in an 
effort to coerce Stone to make admissions fails. 
The dynamic of the relationship between Detective McCormick and Stone 
from the outset was congenial. Stone immediately expressed a willingness to 
talk and tell his "side of the story." The dynamic, however, began to shift when 
Detective McCormick confronted Stone with the fact that his story was 
implausible in light of the results of the CAT scan.4 Shortly thereafter, Stone said 
he was "feel[ing] like" he did not want to talk "without [his attorney]." (Exhibit 2, 
p.230, Ls.15-17.) Detective McCormick responded by telling Stone, who had 
already been twice advised of his Miranda rights, that he could not "control" what 
4 If the length of the transcript is notable, as Stone suggests, this shift in the 
dynamic did not occur until page 218 of the second transcript, which is only 310 
pages long. (Exhibit 2.) 
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Stone did, to which Stone answered, "But I don't feel like I have anything to hide." 
(Exhibit 2, p.230, Ls.20-23.) Despite reiterating his awareness that he could 
consult an attorney, Stone continued to talk and ultimately told Detective 
McCormick that he pointed a gun at Florence and shot her after she told him she 
married him for a green card. (Exhibit, p.292, L.19 - p.293, L.6.) 
Although Detective McCormick told Stone he thought whatever happened 
"was heat of the moment" (Exhibit 2, p.250, Ls.2-3), he did not "feed" any "story" 
to Stone. Instead, he asked Stone what happened that "sent it over the edge" 
(Exhibit 2, p.258, L.1), "[w]hat took [him] to that point" (Exhibit 2, p.265, LS.15-
16). Pressing Stone for an answer was not overreaching just because it was 
effective Cf. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426 (1986) ("[P]olice questioning 
as a tool for effective enforcement of criminal laws cannot be doubted. 
Admissions of guilt are more than merely desirable, they are essential to a 
society's compelling interest in finding, convicting and punishing those who 
violate the law."); United States v. Crawford, 372 F.3d 1048, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 
2004) (en bane) ("Trickery, deceit, even impersonation do not render a 
confession inadmissible, certainly in noncustodial situations and usually in 
custodial ones as well, unless the government makes threats or promises.") 
(internal quotation and citation omitted). Nor does Stone's alleged "susceptibility 
to suggestion" convert otherwise proper questioning into coercive misconduct. 
Connelly, 479 U.S. at 165-166 (rejecting suggestion that voluntariness inquiry 
include courts to "divine a defendant's motivation for speaking or acting as he did 
even though there be no claim that the governmental conduct coerced his 
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decision"). The district court's decision not to consider this aspect of Dr. 
Beaver's testimony was, therefore, proper.5 
Also contrary to Stone's claims, Detective McCormick did not engage in 
overreaching by making any implied promise of leniency. To the contrary, 
Detective McCormick specifically told Stone he did not have the power to do so 
because the judge is the "decision maker." (Exhibit 2, p.250, L.24 - p.251, L.1.) 
That Detective McCormick shared his experience of seeing defendants getting 
credit for accepting responsibility was not improper and does not mean he made 
any promise to Stone, implied or otherwise, that a judge would be more lenient if 
Stone accepted responsibility. See Wilson, supra. 
Because there was nothing coercive about the conduct of law 
enforcement in this case, Stone cannot show error in the denial of his motion to 
suppress. 
D. Even If The Court Considers Other Factors Relating To Voluntariness 
Despite The Lack Of Any Coercive Police Conduct, None Of Those 
Factors Support Stone's Claim That His Admissions Were Involuntary 
In determining whether a defendant's will was overborne by coercive 
police conduct, courts consider "the characteristics of the accused and the details 
of the interrogation," which include: "(1) whether Miranda warnings were given; 
(2) the youth of the accused; (3) the accused's level of education or low 
5 Stone's claim that the court erred in declining to consider Dr. Beaver's 
testimony regarding Stone's alleged suggestibility presumes the factual predicate 
of coercion. (Appellant's Brief, pp.12-18.) Because that factual predicate does 
not exist, Stone's claim of error in relation to the court's limited consideration of 
Dr. Beaver's testimony necessarily fails. 
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intelligence; (4) the length of the detention; (5) the repeated and prolonged 
nature of the questioning; and (6) deprivation of food or sleep." State v. Valero, 
_ Idaho _, 285 P.3d 1014, 1016 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing Schneckloth v. 
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973) and State v. Troy, 124 Idaho 211,214, 
858 P.2d 750, 753 (Ct. App. 1993». 
Stone acknowledges, as he must, that he received Miranda warnings. 
(Appellant's Brief, p.20.) Nevertheless, Stone argues the "fact that Miranda 
warnings were administered has very little to do with whether his statements 
were voluntary given how the police downplayed the warning's importance" by 
"implying that they were mere formalities." (Appellant's Brief, p.20.) This 
argument is without merit. The record reflects that both Deputy Hernandez and 
Detective McCormick clearly advised Stone of his Miranda rights and confirmed 
that he understood those rights. Neither the record nor the law support Stone's 
claim that those warnings were ineffectual because the officers "downplayed" the 
significance of those rights. See Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608-09 
(2004) ("giving the warnings and getting a waiver has generally produced a 
virtual ticket of admissibility; maintaining that a statement is involuntary even 
though given after warnings and voluntary waiver of rights requires unusual 
stamina, and litigation over voluntariness tends to end with the finding of a valid 
waiver"); State v. Doe, 137 Idaho 519,523-524,50 P.3d 1014, 1018-1019 (2002) 
(rejecting claim that Miranda warnings were ineffectual because the detective 
referred to them as a "little sheet of paper" given that the detective "carefully 
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recite[d] the warnings to Doe" and Doe made it clear he knew what the warnings 
were and understood what they meant). 
Stone also asserts he "repeatedly inquired of the officers whether" talking 
to them "was in his best interest and whether he should have the advice of 
counsel before proceeding." (Appellant's Brief, p.20.) This is an inaccurate 
portrayal of Stone's interaction with lawenforcement. When Stone asked Deputy 
Hernandez whether it was in his "best interests to just be quiet," Deputy 
Hernandez responded: "Completely up to you." (Exhibit 1, p.3, Ls.11-13.) Stone 
then makes a comment about "what happened," and the deputy says, "And 
obviously we like to get two sides of the story, you know what I mean?" but he 
did not, at that time, ask Stone what happened. (Exhibit 1, p.3, Ls.15-16.) 
Instead, Stone says, "I'll do whatever you want. I'm a professional." (Exhibit 1, 
p.3, Ls.18-19.) Stone then proceeds to volunteer information without being 
asked any questions. (See generally Exhibit 1, pp.3-6.) 
Regarding Stone's claim that he "repeatedly" asked whether he should 
have the advice of counsel before talking, the following comment by Stone is 
representative of what Stone would say: "I hope I'm doing the right thing talking 
to you guys because I'm working with an attorney closely with this divorce. I 
hope I'm -- he's not going to tell me I've been a major jackass talking to you 
tonight but I really don't feel like I have anything to hide from you guys at all." 
(Exhibit 2, p.73, L.22 - p.75, L.2.) This type of comment hardly reflects an 
inquiry _of law enforcement about whether Stone personally thinks he should talk 
to law enforcement; to the contrary, Stone does not believe he has "anything to 
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hide." Stone did not express any real reluctance about talking to law 
enforcement until after Detective McCormick told him he did not believe Florence 
stabbed Stone as he claimed. That Stone thought, at that point, that he "should 
have lawyered up" (Exhibit 2, p.238, Ls.8-9), does not mean the officers' Miranda 
warnings were inadequate or that they "downplayed" the "significance of them." 
If anything, as noted by the district court, the comments Stone did make about 
waiving his rights reflect his awareness of those rights (Tr., p.396, L.18 - p.397, 
L.3) and the record reflects he was perfectly willing to forego those rights in a 
clear effort to convince law enforcement that he acted in self-defense when he 
shot Florence twice in the back of the head. 
With respect to Stone's age and level of education, the district court found 
that neither characteristic weighed in Stone's favor given that Stone had a 
master's degree and was, at the time of the murder, 49 years old. (Tr., p.399, 
Ls.7-21.) It appears Stone seeks to avoid having this factor considered against 
him by noting that, despite his age, he "never had any contact with law 
enforcement." (Appellant's Brief, p.21.) Experience with law enforcement is, 
however, a different consideration than age and, in any event, this fact is not 
particularly compelling in this case considering Stone told Deputy Hernandez he 
"read up on the law a lot" (Exhibit 1, p.58, L.4) and told Detective McCormick how 
much he liked watching The First 48 (Exhibit 2, p.245, Ls.16-22), which is a 
reality show that "takes viewers behind the scenes of real-life investigations as it 
follows homicide detectives in the critical first 48 hours of murder investigations, 
giving viewers unprecedented access to crime scenes, interrogations and 
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forensic processing." http://www.aetv.com/the-first-48/aboutl (emphasis added). 
Thus, even if Stone himself had never been subject to police questioning, he 
apparently regularly watched others who were. 
The district court also found the other relevant circumstances did not 
support Stone's claim that his confession was involuntary. Specifically, the court 
found the "length of the detention" was not overbearing, particularly since much 
of the interview was taking place while Stone was in the hospital for treatment, 
the questioning was not repeated or prolonged (and to the extent the interview 
was lengthy, that was due, in large part, to the fact that Stone was extremely 
talkative), and there was no deprivation of food or sleep or any other "basic 
need[] during the time that he was hospitalized." (Tr., p.399, L.22 - p.400, L.14.) 
Stone has failed to show any of these findings by the district court were 
erroneous. 
In addition to the foregoing circumstances that are traditionally considered 
in deciding whether a confession is voluntary, Stone also relies on his "physical, 
emotional and psychological state during the interrogation," including the fact that 
he had been involved in an "extremely stressful event," he "was in pain" for which 
he had received medication, he had high blood sugar, was "not allowed to use 
the bathroom," and was "refused the opportunity to meet with his parents or other 
supportive persons." (Appellant's Brief, pp.22-25.) Nothing about any of these 
circumstances individually, or in totality, support Stone's claim that his confession 
was involuntary. 
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As noted in Section C, supra, Stone's arguments based on the "stressful" 
nature of the event, his ability to use the bathroom, and his ability to "meet with 
his parents or other supportive persons," lend no support to his claim of 
involuntariness. Regarding his pain, pain medication, and blood sugar, the 
district court aptly noted it could find no "evidence to substantiate claims that" 
those factors "affect[ed] his mental acuity." (Tr., p.401, Ls.18-20.) The record 
supports this conclusion. 
Because there was no coercive police conduct, Stone was not entitled to 
suppression. In addition to any lack of coercion, the totality of the circumstances 
support the conclusion that Stone's admissions were voluntary. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court's order 
denying Stone's motion to suppress and affirm the judgment entered upon his 
conditional guilty plea to second-degree murder. 
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